Initialising ...
Initialising ...
Initialising ...
Initialising ...
Initialising ...
Initialising ...
Initialising ...
Tokunaga, Sho; Iguchi, Shintaro; Kawamura, Sho; Hirane, Nobuhiko
JAEA-Technology 2022-004, 74 Pages, 2023/02
JAEA-Technology-2022-004.pdf:2.46MB
In JRR-3, in response to the new regulatory standard for research reactors that is enforced December 2013, we submitted the application document of reactor installation license for the JRR-3 on September 2014, and acquired the permission on November 2018. Thereafter, we carried out impact assessment for internal overflow based on the design principles as described in the application document of reactor installation license for the JRR-3. There are two legal requirements for internal overflow. The first is to ensure that the necessary safety functions are not lost due to internal overflow that occur in the facility. The second is to prevent leakage of liquid containing radioactive materials outside the radiation controlled area in the event of an internal overflow. For these requirements, assuming each overflow source, it was confirmed that the necessary safety functions would not be lost and that liquid containing radioactive materials would not leak outside the controlled area. Regarding these assessments, design and construction plans were submitted in installments, and the approvals were obtained sequentially. This report shows the result that is impact assessment for internal overflow in JRR-3.
Tochio, Daisuke; Nagasumi, Satoru; Inoi, Hiroyuki; Hamamoto, Shimpei; Ono, Masato; Kobayashi, Shoichi; Uesaka, Takahiro; Watanabe, Shuji; Saito, Kenji
JAEA-Technology 2021-014, 80 Pages, 2021/09
JAEA-Technology-2021-014.pdf:5.87MB
In response to the new regulatory standards established in response to the accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station in March 2011, measures and impact assessments related to internal flooding at HTTR were carried out. In assessing the impact, considering the characteristics of the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor, flooding due to assumed damage to piping and equipment, flooding due to water discharge from the system installed to prevent the spread of fire, and flooding due to damage to piping and equipment due to an earthquake. The effects of submersion, flooding, and flooding due to steam were evaluated for each of them. The impact of the overflow of liquids containing radioactive materials outside the radiation-controlled area was also evaluated. As a result, it was confirmed that flooding generated at HTTR does not affect the safety function of the reactor facility by taking measures.